Abstract-Route instability is an important contributor to data plane unreliability on the Internet and also incurs load on the control plane of routers. In this paper, we study how route selection schemes can avoid these changes in routes. Modifying route selection implies a tradeoff between stability, deviation from operators' preferred routes, and availability of routes. We develop algorithms to lower-bound the feasible points in these tradeoff spaces. We also propose a new approach, Stable Route Selection (SRS), which uses flexibility in route selection to improve stability without sacrificing availability and with a controlled amount of deviation. Through large-scale simulation, a software-router implementation, and an emulation with real-world BGP update feeds, we demonstrate that SRS is a promising approach to safely stabilize route selection.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I
NSTABILITY is a key problem [15] , [31] , [53] for the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the interdomain routing protocol that knits the fabric of today's Internet. Network hardware failures, software peering failures, policy changes, and the BGP convergence process itself can generate huge numbers of routing updates, affecting both the data and control planes.
In the data plane, it is well known that end-to-end path quality is degraded by BGP route updates (see [52] and references therein). A study of measurements in 2004 and 2005 showed the majority of packet loss bursts were caused by interdomain route convergence problems such as transient forwarding loops, rather than by congestion [53] . These problems are increasingly important as the Internet is becoming a ubiquitous platform for voice and video applications. A measurement of VoIP calls between clients on PlanetLab showed that almost half of problems in these calls were highly correlated with BGP updates, and BGP events were estimated to cause 90% of VoIP call drops [29] . Many Internet games have similar demands for interactivity, commonly sending periodic delay-sensitive bursts of packets [16] . I. Haken, S. Shenker, and I. Stoica are with the University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA (e-mail: yaron@cs.berkeley.edu; shenker@cs.berkeley.edu; istoica@cs.berkeley.edu).
Y. Singer is with Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA (e-mail: haken@berkeley.edu).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TNET.2014.2299795
In the control plane, route update processing incurs CPU load, a problem that has attracted concern [14] , [33] . Current demands on router CPUs appear to be feasible [13] . However, there are two ways update processing can be problematic. First, since BGP updates often arrive in bursts [13] , convergence can be slowed [14] , [33] , which (as discussed above) worsens data plane reliability. Second, update processing could become increasingly expensive or inconvenient if future dramatic routing table growth occurs from IPv6 deployment or further IPv4 deaggregation, or if updates require cryptographic processing [4] .
The main mechanism for improving stability in BGP is route flap damping (RFD) [50] , which filters routes that have a short-term update rate above some threshold. Unfortunately, this seemingly simple strategy creates two serious problems. In 2002, Mao et al. [36] demonstrated that RFD creates pathological conditions that slow convergence. 1 RFD also worsens availability-the fraction of time that a router has a route to a destination-by occasionally shutting off all available routes. The operator community has become aware of these problems, with the RIPE Route Working Group advising in 2006 that "the application of flap damping in ISP networks is NOT recommended.
With current vendor implementations, BGP flap damping is harmful to the reachability of prefixes across the Internet." [45] Other approaches to improving stability require protocol modifications [8] , [36] or address narrow cases [2] , [17] , [22] .
Thus, despite the fact that the problem was recognized more than a decade ago, there is still no compelling mechanism for stabilizing BGP routes.
The goal of this paper is a principled evaluation of the design space of stabilizing BGP by modifying route selection. In other words, we focus not on new protocols, but on working within BGP's decision process. In this context, there are three ways one might improve stability through route selection: 1) reducing "convergence overhead," i.e., the number of route changes triggered by an external event like a link failure; 2) avoiding convergence events by selecting more stable routes; or 3) avoiding convergence events by shutting off all routes between a particular source and destination during periods of instability. Within the restriction (to be formalized later) that routers always select a valid path, techniques to stabilize BGP always fall within one of these classes or a combination of them. The first technique is desirable but may be limited in its potential impact. The second technique implies a tradeoff between stability and deviation from the operator's preferred routes. Deviation is undesirable because operators depend on route selection to achieve objectives like traffic engineering or routing policy. The third technique implies a tradeoff between stability and availability of routes, which is even more serious.
Thus, stabilizing BGP inherently involves navigating tradeoffs between stability, deviation, and availability. This paper characterizes what points are feasible in these tradeoff spaces, with both provable lower bounds and novel route selection strategies. We describe these two parts next.
Lower Bounds: We develop algorithms that lower-bound the performance of theoretically optimal strategies, which allow us to constrain which points in the tradeoff spaces are achievable for any given network topology and pattern of failures. To obtain numerical results, we apply these algorithms to a measured topology of around 20 000 autonomous systems (ASs) with inferred customer/provider/peer relationships and one year of inferred link failure data from Route Views [44] .
Route Selection Strategies: We propose a new Stable Route Selection (SRS) approach that has the goal of safely stabilizing routing: Unlike RFD, it does not reduce availability. Instead, SRS uses flexibility in route selection to prefer more stable paths, causing some deviation from operators' preferred routes, but returning to those preferred routes quickly after periods of instability. We evaluate the performance of SRS and RFD in three environments: simulations of the BGP protocol in the same environment as our lower bounds, a cluster-based deployment of software routers, and a emulation based directly on real-world BGP update feeds.
Simulation Results: Our evaluation consists of both simulations and emulation on a real-world trace of BGP updates. We begin by discussing results in our simulated environment. We caution that it is infeasible to precisely simulate Internet routing at a global scale: It would require full AS-level and router-level maps of the Internet; knowledge of private policies, intradomain topologies, and protocols; the timing of configuration changes, link failures, and other triggers of control plane dynamics; and so on. All of this data is private or only imperfectly available. Therefore, our simulations include a number of simplifications of reality; notably, we model each AS as only a single router. Thus, although our simulations are based on large-scale measurements, they should not be interpreted as accurately predicting the effect of an Internet-wide deployment of SRS or RFD. Instead, the simulations allow us to vet the protocols in one large-scale environment, compare performance among proposals, and study sensitivity to several parameters. Moreover, these simulations represent the largest-scale simulations of BGP dynamics of which we are aware.
With that in mind, our simulations imply the following conclusions.
• Reducing convergence overhead can only improve stability by 5%-20% in our simulated environment, regardless of the presence or absence of route flap damping and the degree of heterogeneity of message propagation delay. However, bigger improvements may be possible for withdrawals by the origin AS and if AS policies do not conform to standard customer-provider-peer relationships, where BGP has higher overhead.
• By allowing deviation from the operator's desired paths but preserving highest availability, our lower bounds in our simulated environment show that standard BGP's stability can be improved by at most (even with oracle knowledge of the future). Our SRS strategy achieves most of this possible benefit: up to 5 better stability than standard BGP, i.e., within 1.6 of the theoretical optimum. Alternately, SRS can provide a 2 improvement over standard BGP while deviating from preferred routes for less than 8 min per day for each destination, on average.
• By also trading off availability, our lower bounds in our simulated environment show that stability might be improved by an additional 2-3 to a total of with some downtime, but bigger improvements are not possible without substantial downtime. RFD does improve stability by about 3 , but at the significant cost of about two "nines" of lost availability with Cisco default parameters. Trace-Based Emulation Results: As discussed above, we cannot claim that the simulations accurately predict the improvement SRS would offer in a real-world, Internet-wide deployment. Therefore, we also evaluate SRS under direct feeds of real BGP update traffic from Internet routers recorded by Route Views [44] . The advantage of this evaluation is that it is much more realistic. However, it represents deployment only at a single router. In this case, the version of SRS that ensures limited deviation obtains only a 12% improvement in stability compared with BGP. One reason for the limited improvement is that, as shown by our simulations, stability increases substantially as SRS is deployed at more routers. We also provide evidence that the limited improvement is due in part to the fact that for most prefixes, all available routes share the same final AS-to-AS link. For prefixes with multiple disjoint paths, we find a more substantial 24% improvement in stability.
Finally, a software router implementation of SRS deployed in a cluster shows that SRS is easily implementable in a production codebase, and that its improved control plane stability translates to improved data plane reliability.
Contributions: In summary, our contributions are as follows.
• We develop algorithms that, for a given dynamic network environment, lower-bound the best possible tradeoff curve between stability of routes, availability of routes, and deviation from arbitrary operator-preferred routes. These algorithms could be applied to other route metrics and may be of independent interest. • We propose SRS, a new approach to stabilizing BGP that improves stability without risk of reducing availability, and with the ability to cause minimal deviation from operators' preferred routes.
• We perform simulations of a large-scale deployment with a year of BGP dynamics data on about 20 000 simulated ASs, demonstrating application of our lower-bound algorithms and a substantial stability improvement from SRS (2-5 depending on desired amount of deviation from preferred routes) and confirming RFD's detrimental effect of reduced availability.
• We evaluate SRS in a realistic small-scale deployment, showing limited average improvement in stability (12%) but greater improvement (24%) for IP prefixes with multiple disjoint announced paths.
• We discuss the effect of SRS on the possibility of BGP divergence, proving that SRS preserves guaranteed convergence under the Gao-Rexford constraints [17] . In Section II, we define our model of BGP, metrics, and classification of approaches to stabilizing BGP. Section III describes our algorithms for obtaining lower bounds in the tradeoff spaces, and Section IV describes our proposed SRS strategies. Our simulation and experimental evaluations appear in Sections V--VII. We analyze SRS's effect on convergence in Section VIII, discuss related work in Section IX, and conclude in Section X.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces a simple abstract model of BGP-style routing (Section II-A) and the main metrics that we study (Section II-B). We then set the stage for the rest of the paper by classifying approaches to stabilizing BGP and their inherent tradeoffs (Section II-C).
Note that the simplifications in this model are used only to aid in discussion, analysis, and parts of our simulation. Our later evaluation on traces of real-world BGP updates, and the SRS approach itself, do not depend on these simplifications.
A. Model of BGP
In this section, we describe a simplified model of BGP that forms the basis of our analytical results.
At a high level, the operation of a BGP router is simple. For each destination (an IP prefix), it learns advertised routes from its peers or neighbors (we will use those two terms interchangeably). It selects one such route to use, according to some route selection policy; and according to some export policy, it may subsequently advertise this selected route, as well as its own local destinations, to other neighbors and peers.
Our model adopts those general rules. We represent the network as a graph, where each node is a router. For convenience, rather than modeling prefixes, we identify one node as the destination . A route is specified as a sequence of nodes along a path to . Each router at any given time has selected either one route to , or no route; and may be advertising this selected route to its neighbors. At any moment in time, each link in the network is either up or down (i.e., failed). Over time, link states change and routers may respond by changing their selected routes and passing messages between neighbors.
Our model includes two important constraints. First, we assume that message propagation and routing decisions take a negligible amount of time, relative to the time between link state changes. We refer to this condition as batching. More specifically, route change events are triggered at specific times, either by link state changes in the underlying topology or by routers deciding to change their selected paths after a timer expires (as in RFD, for example). Such an event triggers a distributed routing reconvergence process. The "batching" assumption is that the time taken by this reconvergence process is negligible compared to the time until the next trigger event. In other words, the resulting routing changes occur in one nearly instantaneous "batch," after which there is a period of tranquility with unchanging routes until the next batch of events is triggered. Batching enables us to obtain bounds on the optimal policies by simplifying the convergence process. Although batching does affect the system and does not always hold in practice, we will observe similar performance with and without batching in our simulations of Section V.
The second condition we impose is path consistency. We say paths are consistent at a given moment if for each router that has currently selected some path , the path passes several "sanity checks" indicating that it is actually a valid path.
• All links in the path are currently up (i.e., not failed).
• The neighboring router has selected the same path, i.e., .
• is currently advertising this route to .
• is the destination . We require that path consistency holds at any time, except during reconvergence events. Any classic path vector routing protocol, BGP included, will converge to path consistency. However, in Section II-C, we discuss several strategies that result in inconsistency.
Subject to the conditions of path consistency and batching, routers may follow any route selection and export policies. Our numerical results will use a range of policies based on inferred real-world business relationships.
B. Metrics
In this section, we define our three main metrics: interruption rate, availability, and deviation.
An interruption is the event that the path selected by some AS changes or is withdrawn entirely (i.e., a transition to the disconnected state). We do not count adding a route as an interruption (i.e., transition from a state where no route to a destination is available, to a state where some route is available). We use interruption rate, which measures instability, as a proxy for data plane performance and control plane CPU utilization due to its computational and analytical tractability and since instability is known to be correlated with data plane unreliability [29] , [52] , [53] . Our experiments in Section VI also correlate interruption rate with packet loss.
We define availability for a particular source-destination pair as the fraction of time that the source has a route to the destination. We will typically study the mean availability over all source-destination pairs.
Finally, deviation measures the extent to which a particular route selection strategy differs from the network operators' preferred paths. Specifically, we compare a sequence of selected paths against a preferred sequence of paths . Deviation is defined as the fraction of time that the route in does not match the route in .
The above requires a definition of the preferred routes and what it means for two routes to match. For , we use the paths selected by the standard BGP decision process; thus, our numerical results measure how much various strategies differ from the status quo. To determine when two routes "match," one option is simply to see when the entire path is equal. However, we observe that the full path may be of limited interest to operators; measurements show that ASs' routing preferences are based on the peer-AS (i.e., the AS that announced the path) for 98% of IP prefixes [51] . Therefore, in our simulations, where we will model each AS as a single router, we say that two routes match when their peer-ASs are equal (i.e., the next hop toward the destination is the same). As with availability, we will study the mean deviation over all source-destination pairs.
C. Approaches to Stabilizing BGP
Within our model, it is possible to give a complete classification of approaches to reducing interruption rate relative to standard BGP.
At a high level, we have a simple choice: Pick the same sequence of paths as standard BGP-except during the instantaneous convergence events-or pick paths that differ. These two cases respectively imply that we must either: (1) mitigate the impact of topology or policy changes by improving the reconvergence process; or (2) avoid reconvergence events altogether. Within the avoidance approach, there are two pure approaches: (2a) select paths that fail less often; and (2b) select no path, disconnecting the source from the destination. These approaches are summarized in Fig. 1 .
These three approaches require qualitatively different sacrifices ranging from free to severe. Approach (1) is the most attractive because it improves stability without compromising other objectives. The two remaining approaches directly imply tradeoffs: (2a) results in nonzero deviation, and (2b) is an extreme approach that sacrifices availability. In the limit, a network where all nodes are disconnected has no interruptions, but also has zero availability.
Note that (2b) is not equivalent to RFD's strategy of shutting off (damping) unstable routes. Damping a route causes BGP to select another route, as long as an alternate undamped route is available. Thus, RFD mixes approaches (2a) and (2b).
Our characterization of the tradeoff spaces places limits on what can and cannot be accomplished with these three approaches. We begin the characterization in Section III with our lower bounds algorithms. Our upper bounds, i.e., implementable strategies, include our new SRS strategies described in Section IV in addition to Standard BGP and RFD. The numerical results of these lower and upper bounds appear in Section V.
Strategies Outside This Classification: Note that policies that allow path inconsistency (defined in Section II-A) are implementable in today's BGP, but fall outside our model. Such strategies are beyond the scope of this work and may be useful. However, we note that as a result of their path inconsistency, they must be handled with care since there is the possibility that routing loops or disconnectivity can persist for nonnegligible periods of time.
To the extent that a 30-s time period is considered nonnegligible, an example of a path-inconsistent strategy is the commonly used Minimum Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI) timer. The MRAI rate-limits update messages to each BGP peer of a router to one per seconds, where is a configurable parameter that may be zero but is sometimes set as high as s. During this period, 's peer may have selected a path that passes through , but which is not the path that has selected, thus violating path consistency. Recently, Huston [26] proposed delaying updates for just longer than an MRAI interval, 35 s, when they match a pattern likely to indicate BGP path exploration. Consecutive matches could delay updates for minutes or more.
III. LOWER BOUNDS
How much can the above approaches reduce the rate of interruptions, and what are the associated tradeoffs with deviation and availability? To answer that question, we numerically lower-bound the best possible interruption rate for given amounts of deviation and unavailability. In this section, we present the procedures for computing the lower bounds. In Section V, we will apply these procedures to the measured topologies and traces used in our simulator, allowing us to compare how close our proposed strategies are to the best possible policies. Specifically, we will show a large gap between standard BGP's performance and the lower bound, indicating potential for improvement, and we show that SRS's performance can be fairly close to the lower bound.
There are two distinct reasons for a gap between the interruption rate indicated by the lower bound and that of any strategy implementable in the real world. First, the theoretical optimal strategy has knowledge of the future pattern of route failures. Second, we show that computing the optimal interruption rate is NP-hard, so we must resort to lower-bounding the optimal.
A. Inputs and Outputs
The procedures take as input an AS-level topology annotated with customer-provider-peer business relationships between ISPs, which they honor; a trace of AS adjacency ("link") failures; and a sequence of preferred route selections over time for each source-destination pair.
Given this input, we will find the following.
• Approach (1): Convergence: We find the minimum number of interruptions required to adhere to the given preferred routes almost always, i.e., at all times except for negligible periods of time during convergence events (formally, a set of times of zero measure).
• Approaches (1) (2a): Stability-Deviation tradeoff:
We compute a set of undominated points such that for each , in the given topology and traces, it is impossible to select routes that achieve both a mean interruption rate of and a mean deviation of , while preserving the highest possible availability. Means are over all sources for a given set of destinations (which will be a random set when we generate results in Section V).
• Approaches (1) (2a) (2b): Stability-Availability tradeoff: We compute a set of undominated points such that for each , it is impossible to select routes that achieve both a mean interruption rate of and a mean unavailability of , with no constraint on deviation. The first item, bounding convergence overhead, appears in Section III-B and is straightforward. In contrast, it is nontrivial to obtain good lower bounds in the tradeoff spaces. We explain why (Section III-C) before describing the procedure (Section III-D) that is similar for the two tradeoff spaces.
B. Convergence
For Approach (1), we must find the minimum number of interruptions achievable solely by improving the convergence process-in other words, with zero deviation and zero unavailability. Batching, described in Section II-A, allows us to easily compute this value. Given a fixed setting of each router's converged state before and after each batch, there must be at least one interruption for each batch in which the route changed or was withdrawn, and at least zero if the path stayed the same. We simply sum these over all batches to produce the desired lower bound for each source-destination pair.
C. Hardness of Minimizing Interruptions
Section III-B showed that it is easy to find the optimal interruption rate for one particular point in the tradeoff spaces: zero unavailability and zero deviation. However, in general, computing the optimal is difficult because of dependencies between nodes when routing to some particular destination.
We illustrate this with an example for another particular point in the tradeoff spaces: that of minimizing interruption rate under the constraint of zero unavailability (but any amount of deviation from preferred routes). Consider the topology of Fig. 2 . Groups 1 and 2 consist of and routers, respectively, which depend on routing through to the destination . Suppose the links and are available during the time interval [0, 10], while and are available during [5, 15] , and all other links are constantly available. Sometime during [5, 10] , must switch from the path to . However, this affects Groups 1 and 2: If switches at time 5, it triggers an interruption at each of the routers in Group 1; if it switches at time 10, it interrupts the routers in Group 2. The optimal routes for , in terms of the cost to the network as a whole, therefore hinge upon whether . We thus have nonlocal dependencies between nodes' route selections.
In fact, it is possible to show that the problem of minimizing the number of interruptions is NP-complete, using a gadget similar to the above as one step of a reduction from SAT. The proof appears in [18] .
D. Tradeoff Procedure
Since it is difficult to find the exact minimal number of interruptions, we resort to lower-bounding the optimal. Specifically, we allow each node to independently select its own route, thus possibly picking a route that was not chosen by the downstream ASs along the path. This relaxation of path consistency will allow us to compute optimal tradeoff values for each (source, destination) pair separately; we then assemble these pieces together to produce an undominated point in the tradeoff spaces.
We first describe two important subroutines that we then use in our final procedure.
Optimal Path Sequence (OPS) Subroutine: This core "inner loop" used by our tradeoff calculations computes the optimal sequence of path selections for a single node over time. Specifically, OPS is given a set of route options. Each option is of the form , meaning path is available during and incurs cost per unit time that it is selected. The cost of causing an interruption (see Section II-B) is fixed at 1. OPS computes the minimum-cost sequence of route selections over time for the given options. This computation is equivalent to a shortest-paths problem on an appropriately constructed abstract graph whose nodes represent route choices and whose edges represent legal transitions between them. Our implementation uses a somewhat more efficient dynamic programming (DP) algorithm. 2 Most Stable Paths Subroutine: This subroutine computes a set of potential routes that will later be fed into the OPS subroutine. Specifically, it calculates, for each source , destination , and time , the available path that will be available starting at and continuing farthest into the future. Given knowledge of the future availability of any given route, this can be computed en masse for all sources and a particular destination using a BGPlike algorithm whose path selection prefers routes that will be available longer.
Computing the future availability of any route involves examining future link failure times, which are easily obtained from the trace provided to the lower bounds procedure. However, it also involves a complication: The future failure time of a route is dependent not only on link failure times, but also on when routers choose to export these routes to neighbors. Specifically, when we later apply our lower bounds algorithms in simulation, we simulate export filters due to business relationships between ASs. If a downstream AS switches from a customer route to a peer route, it will no longer export the route to other peers or providers. We calculate business class switch times by running the route selection simulation twice, recording the business class switch times on the first trial, and using them to compute paths' future failure times in the second. It can be shown, along the lines of the proof of convergence in [17] , that the business class switch times will be identical in both trials.
Putting It All Together: We now describe how we compute a set of undominated points (i.e., a Pareto set) in the tradeoff spaces, utilizing the above subroutines. We begin with the stability-availability tradeoff.
Let be a sequence of path selections for each source-destination pair , and let and represent the number of interruptions and the amount of downtime, respectively, in . Our goal is to produce 's for which the point is undominated. To do this, we begin with the well-known weighted sum method of multiobjective optimization, as follows. We introduce a parameter that intuitively sets the cost of being disconnected per unit time. We next describe how to produce a single undominated point given ; we vary to produce multiple points.
A straightforward application of the weighted sum method would then find the optimal feasible value of that minimized . However, as we showed in Section III-C, computing is hard. We instead optimize each source-destination pair separately. Specifically, for each source and destination we find (using a procedure to be described below) the valid route assignment that minimizes (1) We then construct the network-wide route assignment and finally return the undominated (though potentially infeasible) point . We must show that is in fact not dominated by any feasible point. To see why this is true, assume for the sake of contradiction that there existed some feasible route assignment for which both and . This implies and hence that for some source-destination pair However, then must not have minimized (1)-a contradiction. Hence, the point returned by the procedure is undominated.
We have thus reduced the problem to that of minimizing (1) for an individual source-destination pair . We note 3 that whenever a path is selected at time , an optimal choice is the path that will be available for longest time into the future beginning at time . Thus, the Most Stable Paths subroutine provides (a superset of) the set of routes that might be involved in the optimal sequence,
. We add to this set a persistently available "null route" with cost per unit time and feed all these choices to the OPS subroutine, whose output must be an optimal set of route selections, . That concludes our procedure for lower-bounding the stability-availability tradeoff. Our bound in the stability-deviation space is quite similar. The main difference stems from the fact that route preferences are often [51] based on peer-ASs (i.e., neighbors in our abstract network model; see Section II-B). Thus, optimizing for deviation requires consideration of the route through the most preferred neighbor that will be available longest into the future, rather than just the overall longest-lived route. In other words, the optimal route assignment across time for a source might include routes that are not the overall longest-lived, but which are the longest-lived through 's most preferred neighbor. These routes may fall outside the candidate set computed by the Most Stable Paths subroutine defined above. We modified the Most Stable Paths subroutine to obtain these routes. We label them with costs per unit time-zero while they are preferred, or otherwise-and then feed them into OPS to produce .
IV. STABLE ROUTE SELECTION
We next describe our proposed class of Stable Route Selection strategies. SRS avoids instability by using flexibility in route selection to select more stable paths [approach (2a) in the classification of Section II-C]. Intuitively, paths that have been 3 For a proof, see [ stable recently are likely to be stable in the future. SRS gives a tunable weight to a path's recent stability as part of the BGP decision process, thus giving a tradeoff between stability and amount of deviation from preferred paths. In this section, we describe where SRS fits in the context of the BGP decision process (Section IV-A), and then how our SRS strategy selects paths (Section IV-B).
A. Fitting SRS Into BGP
BGP's decision process [47] allows operators to customize route selection to conform to goals such as traffic engineering or economic relationships. The BGP decision process consists of the sequence of steps shown in Table I , which select a route based on attributes contained in the BGP route announcements. The output of each step is a set of routes that are equally good according to that and every previous step. By adding, modifying, or filtering attributes in update messages, operators can control the specific route selected to reach a particular destination.
We insert the SRS heuristic as an additional step between Steps 1 and 2 of the BGP decision process. SRS selects the best route based on a combination of Steps 2-7 and a heuristic for predicting route stability. We present the details of SRS in Section IV-B.
An alternate design would have placed SRS before the first step, like flap damping. We chose to place SRS after the Local Preference step to ensure that the highest-level routing preferences, such as preferring customer routes over provider routes, are always maintained, even during SRS's delay period (see below). This has at least two benefits. First, it provides a useful guarantee to operators. Second, it is possible for a violation of the Local Preference step to reduce availability for other ASs. In particular, ASs typically have business relationships with other ASs classified as providers, customers, or peers; a route advertised by a provider or peer is exported only to customers [17] . If an AS were to select a provider route over a customer route, it would block the export of the route to other providers and peers, potentially disconnecting them from the destination. Although this case may be uncommon, it is our primary concern to ensure high availability.
Despite the restrictions imposed on SRS by being subordinate to Local Preferences, in our simulations, sufficient flexibility remains to significantly improve stability.
Interaction With iBGP: iBGP differs from eBGP in that it lacks general-purpose loop detection. This causes an unfortunate interaction with choosing routes based on timing. Because routers within an AS will receive announcements at slightly different times, if iBGP routes were chosen in a way dependent on timing, they may select different best paths, potentially causing forwarding loops. The RFD RFC [50] recommends applying RFD to external peers only rather than iBGP-learned routes to avoid forwarding loops.
SRS could adopt a similar approach, but this limits its choice of available routes. An alternative is that instead of placing SRS after local preference in the decision process, it can be implemented by adjusting local preference values (e.g., using an import filter before routes reach the decision process). Assuming some separation between local preference values used by the operator, SRS can still respect the operator's values by making adjustments only at a finer granularity. The single router within an AS that receives a route via eBGP would adjust the local preference value, and then (if it is the best route) propagate the route into iBGP. Other routers within the AS would select routes based on the local preference value rather than directly applying SRS. This implementation approach has the advantages of: 1) converging to a consistent route selection decision, thus avoiding forwarding loops; and 2) forcing propagation into iBGP of some routes that are preferred by SRS but might otherwise be suppressed. An iBGP implementation of SRS should however be evaluated experimentally before deployment. We leave this to future work; our simulations will treat each AS as a single router.
B. SRS Heuristic
The SRS heuristic is inserted between Steps 1 and 2 of the BGP decision process (Table I) . The heuristic has one main parameter, a delay . We will write to indicate the value; SRS with the parameter omitted refers to . SRS uses a procedure, , that implements Steps 2-7 in Table I. returns "first" if path is more preferred according to Steps 2-7, "second" if is more preferred, or "equal" if they are equally preferred. SRS then decides which of two paths should be selected as follows. 1) If has been up for time and "first", then select . 2) Otherwise, if has been up for time and "second", then select . 3) Otherwise, if one of and is currently selected, keep that route. 4) Otherwise, if one of and has lower AS path length, select that route. 5) Otherwise, select the route that has been up for the longest time. The winning route is selected by iterating this pairwise comparison over all available routes.
The intuition behind this choice of steps is as follows. Steps 1 and 2 select preferred routes, as long as they are not recent advertisements. This step assumes that recently advertised routes are more likely to be withdrawn soon and provides a tradeoff in the parameter .
is equivalent to the decision procedure , while
gives no consideration to preferred routes, reserving maximum flexibility for stability.
The strategy of sticking with the current choice (Step 3) and then using a "longest uptime" strategy if that choice fails (Step 5) has been used in many contexts from page replacement to peer-to-peer systems and is a good heuristic for stability since past behavior is frequently correlated with future behavior [20] . The shortest-path step (Step 4) is useful to limit path length when running , but is less important when since this strategy eventually returns to the most preferred routes that are presumably reasonably short. In simulations, we found that inserting Step 4 for slightly improved stability as well.
It was recently pointed out to us by Griffin [23] that the above heuristic lacks the desirable property of transitivity for even assuming that pref is transitive. That is, SRS might prefer over and over but not over . This can be easily fixed by deleting Steps 3 and 4 of the heuristic. 4 However, our evaluation uses the original version above.
V. ANALYTICAL AND SIMULATION EVALUATION
In this section, we describe results from a simulation-based evaluation, as well as the results of our lower bounds algorithms applied to the same environment as the simulator. We describe our simulation methodology in Section V-A and present results in Section V-B.
A. Methodology
Data Sets: We infer the interdomain AS-level topology by culling AS adjacencies from Route Views [44] feeds. Since policies on the Internet are not widely disclosed, we use [48] to infer and assign local preferences associated with business relationships as done in [31] , [36] , and [49] , characterizing links as either provider-customer or peer-peer. We assume ASs distribute routes according to the common-case import and export policies as discussed in [48] : ASs prefer customer over peer and peer over provider routes and do not advertise routes from peers/providers to other peers/providers.
To infer the pattern of failures, we record the appearances and departures of links from the Route Views feeds. Specifically, we consider a link to be available at time if some route that uses the link is currently advertised to a Route Views peer at time . In this manner, we infer a trace of link state changes from Route Views from January 1 to December 30, 2006, which we replay against our simulator.
Simulator: To evaluate the performance of various route selection strategies, we use a discrete-event BGP simulator extended from that of [11] . The simulator's events are at the level of link state changes and BGP update messages. As in some past studies [7] , [49] , we represent each AS as a single node running a BGP instance, for scalability and since internal AS topology are not available. Inter-AS packet propagation delay is selected randomly for each packet, uniformly distributed between 5 and 15 ms.
The simulator runs a simplified version of the BGP protocol described in RFC 4271 [43] . Since our simulator models each AS as a single router, Steps 3-6 of the decision process (see Table I ) are not executed. For Step 7, we assign each AS a uniform random router ID.
We implement batching (see Section II-A) in the simulator to compare to our lower bounds. We do this in such a way that the BGP update messages are processed in the same order that they would have been with link delays and MRAI timers turned on and with subsequent topology changes delayed until after the convergence process completed.
Each plot incorporates measurements of at least 100 trials for each configuration of the simulator. In each trial, we select a single random destination to which all nodes route over a random month of our yearlong data. We gather measurements only after the first 24 h of simulated time to eliminate initial convergence effects. Since some data are missing from our topology, causing a minority of nodes to be always disconnected, when collecting measurements, we ignore source-destination pairs whose availability in the Standard BGP strategy (without flap damping) is . Other than excluding ASs that were usually disconnected, this did not substantially affect our results.
Route Selection Strategies: Our simulations will compare the basic BGP decision process, which we call Standard BGP, to SRS and to RFD as in RFC 2439 [50] .
RFD maintains a set of numeric penalty values. The domain of this set varies across implementations. RFC 2439 specifies that there is a separate penalty value associated with each (prefix, AS path) pair by default, with the (discouraged) option to exclude the AS path. Our simulator, similar to the most widely deployed implementations of RFD, uses the BGP peer instead of the AS path, so that there is a numeric penalty value associated with every (prefix , BGP peer ) pair. Upon receipt of an advertisement or withdrawal, the router increases . When increases beyond a cutoff threshold, the route is excluded from consideration when selecting routes. The penalty decays exponentially, and the route is reconsidered for use when its value falls below a reuse threshold. In our tests, unless otherwise stated, the strategy "RFD" refers to flap damping with Cisco's default parameters, which increase by 500 after attribute changes and by 1000 for withdrawals, and specify a reuse threshold of 750, a cutoff threshold of 2000, and a decay half-life of 15 min [36] . We also test with flap damping parameters used by Juniper [36] and SprintLink [46] and with three sets of parameters recommended by RIPE [40] .
B. Results
This section presents the results of our simulation and our lower-bounds analysis, both applied to the environment described above. Our main conclusions are as follows.
• Batching, which allows us to obtain bounds on the optimal policies, preserves the qualitative performance of various strategies (Section V-B.1).
• Improvements to convergence cannot obtain a large improvement in our environment. This conclusion is surprisingly robust under various message propagation delay distributions, but convergence overhead can be larger due to policy misconfiguration and withdrawals by origin ASs (Section V-B.2).
• can obtain a dramatic improvement in stability compared to Standard BGP and greater than that of RFD, without sacrificing availability and closely approaching our lower bound (Section V-B.3).
• By adjusting the delay parameter appropriately, SRS can reduce interruption rate by 68% while deviating from preferred paths less than 0.6% of the time (Section V-B.4).
• SRS only slightly increases mean path length (Section V-B.5), and stability-aware routing can obtain significant improvements in stability even under limited deployment scenarios (Section V-B.6). Fig. 3 shows performance of various strategies both without and with batching. Recall from Section II-A that batching makes link delays and MRAI timers negligible, allowing us to lower-bound the interruption rate of optimal policies. We see a substantially similar relationship between the strategies with batching on and off, which suggests that batching is a reasonable approximation under which to compare strategies. The main difference is inflated interruption rates, which can be explained by the fact that in Fig. 3(a) some link state changes may be effectively skipped as a result of link delays and MRAI timers, while in the batched environment, the system finishes reconverging after every topological change.
1) Effect of Batching:
2) Convergence Overhead: Fig. 3(b) shows the interruption rate of Standard BGP and SRS along with their hypothetical counterparts with optimal convergence-which transition from the initial to the final path in each batch without any path exploration process. This shows that in our environment, convergence has only a minor contribution to interruption rate. However, on what aspects of the environment does this conclusion depend? We investigated how origin events, policy misbehavior, and heterogeneity of link delays affect convergence overhead. In what follows, we define the overhead ratio of a route selection scheme as the number of interruptions experienced by the scheme divided by the minimum number of interruptions Origin Events: ISPs may withdraw and announce prefixes either intentionally or due to configuration error, triggering long sequences of path hunting that are triggered relatively rarely by our Route Views traces of link state changes. Here, we consider the effect of an origin AS announcing or withdrawing a single prefix. To do this, we constructed a trace consisting of announcements/withdrawals separated by long periods of time. This allowed us to measure the convergence overhead for each change in isolation and allowed us to compare against the BGP Beacons measurement study by Mao et al. [37] . Like [37] , we found that prefix advertisements generate roughly 3-5 fewer updates than withdrawals. For example, with our default configuration, we found routing advertisements incurred an overhead ratio of 1.14, while withdrawals incurred an overhead ratio of 6.00 on average. In addition, we found that failing a single link adjacent to the destination incurred an average overhead ratio of 3.90, while repairing the single link incurred an average overhead ratio of 1.03. For further measurements of path exploration, see [39] .
Policy Misconfiguration: Misconfigured ISPs may introduce oscillations and instability that can lengthen convergence periods. We randomly selected a small fraction of ASs to "misbehave" by selecting routes based on a uniform-random preference ordering among peer ASs, rather than our default configuration based on the Gao-Rexford policies [17] . We found that having a fraction of ASs misbehave in this manner can increase convergence overhead; for example, the convergence overhead ratio is 2.68 with 2% of ASs misbehaving, or 2.70 with 5% misbehaving.
Link Delay: Increasing the delay of links, or the heterogeneity of delays across links, has been associated with worsening of routing convergence times [30] . To measure this, we varied the distribution of delays of inter-AS links in our simulator. We assigned each link a delay sampled from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter , which controls the variance of the distribution, and varying mean . Results are shown in Table II . Like previous work, we found that increasing link delays increases convergence time. However, varying the variance of links, and varying the mean delay of links, only changed convergence overhead slightly. Like previous work [21] , we also found that enabling MRAI increases convergence time, but reduces control overhead.
3) Stability-Availability Tradeoff: Fig. 3 shows performance of various strategies in the stability-availability space. Comparing the points in Fig. 3(a) , where batching is disabled, Standard BGP maintains a high availability of 99.98%, but suffers from a high rate of 20.8 interruptions per month. RFD with Cisco's default parameters reduces the mean rate of interruptions by 2.9 , but sacrifices two "nines" of availability, and the other parameter values used by Sprint and Juniper and recommended by RIPE have substantially similar performance. In contrast, by preferring more stable paths, SRS is able to achieve the high availability of standard BGP with even fewer interruptions than RFD. Although we do not advocate the use of RFD, we note that using RFD and SRS in conjunction results in an additional 3.1-fold decrease in interruption rate over RFD and slightly improves availability over RFD alone. This is to be expected, since by picking more stable paths, RFD is triggered less often. Fig. 4 explores the pattern of interruptions in more detail with a complementary cumulative distribution function (CDF) over all measured end-to-end paths. That is, the -axis shows the fraction of (source, destination) pairs that have at least the interruption rate on the -axis. Standard BGP's long tail shows what other studies [15] have observed: A small number of Internet routes suffer from high instability. Both SRS and RFD drastically reduce the size of this tail. SRS is able to achieve roughly the same benefit in the tail as RFD without incurring RFD's reduction in availability. Unlike RFD, SRS improves stability for the upper part of the curve, i.e., for routes that have only moderate instability. This is expected, as SRS with delay always chooses more stable routes over less stable ones, while RFD is explicitly designed to only help the outliers. Finally, when we combine SRS with RFD, we note that the instability of the most unstable routes is reduced by about an order of magnitude compared to RFD in isolation. Fig. 3 (b) also compares performance with lower bounds on the optimal policies. SRS performs surprisingly close to optimal among strategies that achieve the highest availability, with an interruption rate just 55% higher than our lower bound, which uses knowledge of the future. Factoring out SRS's convergence overhead, it would be just 27% worse than optimal. These results indicate that the SRS heuristic does a very effective job of predicting the relative stability of paths in this environment. It also shows that BGP's stability cannot be improved by more than about 8.1 without sacrificing availability, given our assumptions such as the preservation of common business relationshipbased routing policies and path consistency (see Section II-A). Finally, the "Lower Bound" curve in Fig. 3(b) demonstrates limits on how much improvement can be gained by occasionally disconnecting nodes. This lower bound admits the possibility that stability can be improved to about two interruptions per month with small availability loss, but any further improvements come at the cost of significantly more downtime. For example, reaching one interruption per month requires reducing availability from 99.96% to below 99.8%, i.e., over 4 as much downtime.
4) Stability-Deviation Tradeoff:
The above results, which set SRS's delay parameter to , assume SRS is permitted to deviate greatly from the operator's preferred routes. In this section, we explore the tradeoff between stability and the fraction of time that routes deviate from the peer ASs chosen by Standard BGP. Fig. 5(a) shows the stability-deviation tradeoff that results from varying SRS's delay parameter, in the batched environment. With a delay of s, SRS cuts interruption rate by about 38% compared to Standard BGP and has a mean deviation of 0.021%, with 99.5% of ASs having deviation %. At the knee of the tradeoff curve, with min, interruption rate is 69% lower than Standard BGP; mean deviation is 0.54% , and 86% of ASs have deviation %. Fig. 5(b) shows that even with batching off (MRAI and link delays on), SRS with min still reduces interruption rate by 68%. These results are promising: Many ISPs base bandwidth utilization payments on the 95th percentile of the traffic load for each month [38] , so a deviation of less than 1% may be acceptable.
We also note there may be cases where it is useful to move beyond the knee to obtain greater stability. For example, if an ISP has the ability to route multiple classes of traffic along different routes, it would be possible to send the most stability-sensitive flows (e.g., real-time voice traffic) along SRS paths, and other flows along whichever paths minimize maximum link utilization. This would allow the ISP to achieve critical traffic engineering objectives while still providing greater stability where it matters. Fig. 5 (a) also plots our lower bound to the optimal achievable points in the stability-deviation space (without sacrificing availability). In contrast with the stability-availability lower bound, this is quite far from the upper bound, SRS. It is likely that the true optimal is actually much closer to SRS. To see why, recall that due to computational intractability of computing the optimal, we lower-bound the optimal by computing the optimal sequence of paths for each node independently, allowing nodes to take inconsistent paths. In particular, a node can adhere to its preferred peer AS, while choosing the remainder of the path to be maximally stable. However, this has implications on the amount of deviation of the nodes along the path, which our lower bound algorithm does not take into account. Providing a substantially better lower bound would likely be possible for an alternate definition of deviation: requiring that the entire path matches the preferred path, rather than just the peer AS.
5) Path Length:
The previous section dealt with adherence to general routing objectives, in the form of peer-AS preferences. In this section, we study one objective that is not reducible to peer AS: path length. Fig. 6 shows the CDF of mean path length over source-destination pairs.
has a mean path length of 4.14 AS-level hops, or just 4.2% greater than Standard BGP's 3.97 hops. We note that BGP itself empirically incurs an AS-level path inflation of 49.8% due to policies [5] . Hence, an additional inflation of 5% (resulting in a combined inflation of roughly 56.4%) may be tolerable to some ISPs, while others may tune SRS to reduce this inflation at the expense of a somewhat lower stability.
This low inflation may be expected since part of the SRS heuristic prefers shorter paths (Section IV). In addition, path lengths in this environment are constrained by the hierarchical nature of the AS graph when business relationships are satisfied: We found that a hypothetical strategy that always preferred longest paths would have mean path length just 32% longer than Standard BGP.
6) Partial Deployment:
The previous results assume SRS is deployed at all ASs. What improvement can be obtained with a partial deployment?
Due to space constraints, we briefly summarize the effect of partial deployment; see [18] for the full results. We also note that the partial deployment results of [18] evaluated an earlier version of SRS that used a Random Replacement [20] strategy rather than Longest Uptime, but with substantially similar performance.
Our simulations showed that a single AS deploying the protocol could obtain a mean of reduction in interruption rate for itself. This improved roughly linearly with the fraction of ASs running the stable route selection protocol, until the full reduction in the interruption rates is obtained with full deployment (similar to the improvement with a full deployment of as shown in previous plots). This is due to the distributed nature of BGP path selection: Each AS that prefers more stable routes effectively stabilizes routes on behalf of other ASs that route through it (including those running standard BGP).
We also found that certain ASs unilaterally deploying the protocol could obtain a bigger improvement. In particular, we found that individual Tier-1 ASs (as classified by [48] ), which have more flexibility in path choice, had a median reduction in interruption rate of 2.7 .
C. Deficiencies of the Simulation Results
The simulation results presented in this section afforded us a great deal of flexibility-scaling to large networks, simulating partial or full deployment, and comparing to the theoretical optimal. However, the simulation is disconnected from a real deployment in two key ways. First, it is a control-plane simulation, rather than an implementation including a data plane, so we cannot directly measure data-plane effects. We address this deficiency in Section VI by testing a software router deployment.
Second, the environment (topology, routing policies, link failure patterns) may be unrealistic, even though we used data sets inferred from real-world measurements. In particular, each AS was modeled as only a single router. One way this affects the results is that the single simulated router receives all routes advertised to the AS, whereas in a real deployment, these will, at least for a large AS, be split across multiple border routers. Although these routes can be propagated via iBGP among routers within an AS (see discussion in Section IV-A), this is not equivalent to the AS making a single decision, due to message timing and other issues. Our simulations therefore may overestimate the amount of flexibility in route selection available to SRS (and RFD) at each individual router at a given point in time.
We address many of the above problems in Section VII by using direct feeds of BGP updates from actual Internet routers. This eliminates many sources of inaccuracy including Internetwide topology, routing policies, link failure patterns, and iBGP effects in the real-world Internet. However, it utilizes a single emulated SRS router with multiple eBGP peerings (fed by the real-world BGP update traces), and thus does not emulate SRS running over iBGP. We leave such a study to future work.
VI. SOFTWARE ROUTER EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate SRS in a network of software routers. Although the scale is much smaller than our simulator, the deployment yields two results. 1) We verify that SRS is easily implementable in a production codebase, requiring just 81 lines of new or altered code in the Quagga software router. 2) We measure improvement in data-plane performance in this realistic implementation (note that our simulations only studied the control plane). Our results show that SRS can substantially improve data plane performance over other strategies; interestingly, a delay of min performs better than . We describe our experimental methodology in Section VI-A and our results in Section VI-B.
A. Methodology
Our experimental evaluation is based on the BGP implementation in the Quagga software router [42] . We modified Quagga in two main ways: We implemented new route selection policies in the decision process, and we built a custom forwarding plane to enable more flexible experimentation. The SRS-related changes (i.e., not including the custom forwarding plane) required 81 non-comment lines of new or altered code.
We then evaluated the resulting software router by deploying it on a cluster and emulating failures. These steps are described in more detail below, and the overall arrangement of components is depicted in Fig. 7 .
Route Selection Policies: We altered Quagga's decision process to (optionally) run SRS with delay or min. We also tested several strategies already implemented in Quagga: what we have referred to as Standard BGP; Quagga's default strategy, which employs a longest-uptime step directly before the final router-ID step of the decision process; and Route Flap Damping, again with Cisco-default parameters.
Data Plane: We built a custom data plane to enable more complete instrumentation and to conveniently run on a shared cluster. In effect, this data plane allows us to use Quagga as a router for an overlay network. As depicted in Fig. 7 , we instrumented Quagga so that it sends route updates, in the form of (destination, peer-AS) pairs, to our forwarding plane, rather than to the kernel. The forwarding plane generates, receives, and forwards UDP packets to remote forwarding plane processes, as directed by Quagga's route updates. We generate a flow of data packets between every pair of software routers. For each (source, destination) pair, these packets are inserted randomly with a mean interarrival time of 5 s, uniformly distributed within [4.5, 5.5] s. For example, in tests with nodes, the data plane probes are generated in total at a rate of per second.
Emulating Failures: We emulate link failures by leveraging Linux's iptables facility, with which we can block or unblock UDP and TCP traffic between pairs of software routers at appointed times. This allows us to emulate a trace of link failures and recoveries over our chosen network topology. We configured our software routers using two small-scale network topologies. First, we employ IS-IS link-state updates and topology traces from the Abilene backbone network [1] . We repurposed this so that each IS-IS router is treated as a BGP instance with each router given a different AS number and Abilene's intradomain links translating to eBGP peerings. Although our primary target is interdomain rather than intradomain routing, this gives us an environment of scale appropriate for our testbed. The topology contains 11 nodes and 14 edges. We use a portion of this trace from August 10 to October 13, 2004. We "compressed" this trace by reducing to 2 min every interval of greater than 2 min in which no events occurred. This reduced the length of the one-month trace to 7.3 h. The compression step preserves the ordering of events, while allowing us to run tests in a shorter time period and to stress-test the route selection policies in a more challenging environment. This does change the pattern of failures and can have an effect on the performance of the strategies we test. However, the main goal of this section is not to test a realistic pattern of failures, but rather to observe the effects of moving from a simulation environment with only a control plane, to an implementation with a data plane.
The second environment we use is a synthetic Erdös-Rényi random graph, i.e., nodes with edges connected uniformly at random. We used and , so that the average node degree is 4. We generated a bimodal pattern of failures among the edges: A random set of 40 are stable, never failing; the other 10 are unstable, with a heavy-tailed uptime distribution of mean 2 min, and constant 1-min downtimes. The trace lasts 2 h.
We exclude results near the beginning and end of the trace to avoid measuring startup and shutdown effects. We show results from single trials, but we have found repeated trials produce very similar results.
B. Results
Table III classifies packets by their fate. The columns respectively indicate packets that were received, dropped because there was no route to the destination, sent along a virtual link that was down (i.e., dropped by iptables), dropped after exceeding the maximum hop-count, or dropped for unknown reasons (presumably, dropped by the underlying physical network). Fig. 8 depicts data-plane performance in the form of the distribution of "gap lengths." We say that a generated packet lies in a gap of length 0 if it was received by the destination, and it lies in a gap of length if it is one of a run of dropped packets. Gap lengths are significant since brief outages can often be masked by retransmission. Note that a gap length of corresponds to an outage of s. In both environments, substantially decreases packet loss. In the Random Graph, it is able to avoid all unstable links within the 250-s period before measurements begin, resulting in zero measured packet loss. Although this is an artificial environment, it demonstrates that SRS successfully finds the stable paths. Flap damping, in contrast, fails to find them in a reasonable amount of time; this is somewhat surprising, given the simplicity of the bimodal failure pattern.
Despite its lower overall drop rate, has a slightly longer tail in the gap length distribution (see Fig. 9 ), and more of its dropped packets are due to lacking a route provided by the control plane. Surprisingly, even though it is given less flexibility, is a win over in every type of dropped packet, as well as in the tail of the gap length distribution.
still has a longer tail than Standard BGP, but only after the 99.98th percentile. While we have not directly confirmed the cause of the above effects (the long tail with and improved performance with ), a plausible explanation involves path length. As we have confirmed in our simulator, results in substantially shorter path lengths (since SRS returns to shorter paths rather than simply sticking Fig. 9 . Fig. 8(a) , zoomed in.
with the current path until it fails). Longer paths can lead to increased convergence time or failure rate simply because a longer path involves more links that may fail.
Standard Quagga offers a marginal improvement over Standard BGP in the Abilene environment. RFD also reduces the fraction of packets sent along dead links, which is the largest cause of packet loss in Standard BGP and Standard Quagga. However, RFD pays for this with a large number of packets dropped due to having no route, and we can see from 
VII. EVALUATION WITH ROUTE VIEWS UPDATE FEEDS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SRS using feeds of BGP updates from actual Internet routers, as collected by Route Views [44] . Note that while the simulations of Section V used traces of AS-level link state availability that were derived from Route Views, in this case we use unmodified streams of updates, providing a much more realistic evaluation. However, the deployment scenarios are more limited: Only a single node runs SRS, whereas Section V was able to explore effects of all or a subset of nodes running SRS.
In this evaluation, SRS provides very little benefit for the average IP prefix. We find that one reason is correlation in paths: For most prefixes, although multiple paths are available, they have a common last link. For prefixes that have path diversity, SRS provides greater improvement.
A. Methodology
Our evaluation is based on a log of update messages and periodic snapshots of the routing tables (RIBs) from about 42 Internet routers, called views, which peer with a Route Views data collector. This data gives us a way to determine the control-plane effect of running SRS at a single router that peers with some subset of these views.
Specifically, our emulator proceeds as follows. In each trial, we create a router that has "virtual peerings" with a random subset of 5 of the Route Views views. This router receives 1 month of data, beginning with a snapshot of the RIB and proceeding with the update messages that it would receive from each of its virtual peers. We emulate the BGP and SRS decision processes over this data, recording interruptions and other measurements on a per-prefix basis. When collecting data, we ignore the first 200 000 s (2.3 days) to avoid startup effects.
The results we present are based on 40 trials for each of the two strategies: 10 trials from each month between November 2008 and February 2009. We show 95% confidence intervals.
We fix SRS's delay parameter at min. This is somewhat lower than the min value that was the knee of the stability-deviation tradeoff curve in our simulations (Section V), thus representing a more conservative operating point in the sense of minimizing deviation from the operator's preferred routes.
B. Results
In our experiments, SRS with delay min decreases mean interruption rate by 12%:
We next examine how this result behaves as a function of the prefix length and diversity of available paths (to be defined below). These results are shown in Fig. 10 .
Prefix Length: Fig. 10(c) shows that SRS has similar performance on prefixes of length . For shorter prefixes, the variance in the results is quite high [ Fig. 10(a) ]; note that there are relatively few prefixes of length [ Fig. 10(e) ]. Path Diversity: We define path diversity for each prefix as follows. At a given point in time, the path diversity is the number of distinct penultimate ASs among the available paths at that time. (This definition is essentially equivalent to the number of AS-disjoint routes. 5 ) We then take the mean of this value across all times that there is at least one available route for the prefix. In plotting results, we group prefixes into bins by rounding their mean path diversity to the nearest integer ; we will refer to these prefixes as having diversity . Fig. 10(d) shows that for prefixes with diversity , SRS achieves only an 8.7% reduction in interruption rate compared to BGP. However, performance improves substantially once there are multiple disjoint paths, with a 23% or 27% reduction when path diversity is or , respectively. It is unclear why the interruption rate is higher for path diversity . However, the variance of the SRS measurements is much higher here, and the difference between the two schemes is not statistically significant [see 95% confidence intervals in Fig. 10(b) ]. Considering all prefixes with diversity as a group, there is a 24% reduction in interruption rate.
Conclusions: There are likely several reasons that SRS's improvement over BGP is more limited than our previous simulations suggested. First, as we have shown, SRS performs better with higher path diversity; but about 62% of prefixes have path diversity
[ Fig. 10(f) ]. Even if the destination AS has multiple providers, this can occur if the AS is announcing the prefix to only one provider, which is a common way of performing traffic engineering. Our simulator did not consider traffic engineering. Second, in this section, our evaluation methodology allows us to emulate only a single router running SRS, while most of our previous results dealt with the case that all routers run SRS. Our results of Section V-B.6 suggest that performance would improve with wider deployment.
VIII. SRS'S EFFECT ON BGP SAFETY
Thus far, we have been concerned with improving BGP's stability in terms of its rate of interruptions over time. However, a different notion of stability is, if anything, more common in the literature: eventual convergence versus divergence. This line of research examines BGP's convergence process from an arbitrary initial state, but generally in a static environment (no link failures or recoveries or policy changes). The most desirable property is safety: guaranteed convergence to a stable state in finite time, regardless of the exact timing of events and regardless of the initial path selections.
It is well known [22] that BGP may be unsafe: The distributed convergence process might continually reselect routes forever due to "conflicts" in ASs' policies. This raises a natural question: Might SRS's change to the BGP decision process actually cause divergence in some cases, thwarting the overall goal of stability?
In Section VIII-A, we discuss SRS's effect on BGP safety in the general case. In Section VIII-B, we show that SRS and a class of related time-dependent route selection strategies preserve BGP's guaranteed safety under the Gao-Rexford constraints [17] that represent a common case of BGP policies. We summarize the situation in Section VIII-C.
A. General Case
Changing the decision process from standard BGP to SRS can, in some cases, cause divergence-while in other cases, it can cause convergence where BGP would otherwise diverge. An example of the latter for is Fig. 11 (examples for exist, but are somewhat more complex). This fact alone, however, neither detracts from nor supports SRS because it is true of any modification to BGP. Indeed, in a Fig. 11 . Example network in which BGP diverges but converges. Router 0 is the destination; routers 1-4 make route selection decisions using the orderings shown in blue. These path preferences result in no stable state. However, suppose router 1's preferences arose simply as a result of BGP's tiebreaking step: The paths 120 and 140 had the same AS path length and other properties, except router 2 had a lower router ID than 4. Then, because prefers paths that are currently selected, the following paths are a stable state: 140, 20, 3140.
separate note [19] , we show that essentially any change to BGP's decision process, even seemingly trivial changes in tiebreaking or configuration, provably will in some cases cause divergence where BGP would otherwise converge, and will in other cases cause convergence where BGP would otherwise diverge. Intuitively, BGP is a complex system, and an arbitrarily small "nudge" can tip it toward or against convergence.
A better question is thus whether SRS might cause divergence in some case that is important in the real world. We provide a partial answer next.
B. Guaranteed Safety Under the Gao-Rexford Constraints
Guaranteeing BGP safety in real-world situations is difficult because it is hard to capture the diversity of real-world policies, and because it is provably hard to decide many questions of BGP convergence (in general, deciding whether a BGP network might diverge is PSPACE-complete [12] ). However, one model of real-world policies under which BGP is safe was introduced by Gao and Rexford [17] and has the following constraints. GR1) A link between two ASs corresponds to a business relationship: The ASs are either peers, or one is a provider and the other is a customer. GR2) There is no cycle formed by a series of customer-toprovider links. GR3) A router exports a route if and only if the route was learned from a customer or locally, or is being exported to a customer. GR4) A router prefers to select routes through customers; if none are available, it prefers to select routes through peers; and otherwise, will pick a route through a provider. These constraints represent a common case of import and export policies [6] and were also employed in our simulations (Section V-A).
We next show that under the Gao-Rexford constraints, a certain class of route selection strategies including SRS is safe.
We adopt the model of [17, Section 3] . Briefly, the model assumes a set of interconnected ASs, each with potentially multiple routers. It is assumed that a route received by one router in an AS is eventually propagated to all other routers in the AS. 6 The activation sequence defines the times at which BGP routers rerun their path selection processes. The activation sequence must be fair in the sense that each router is activated infinitely often, but is otherwise arbitrary. We will require a slightly modified fairness property that accounts for real time: Each activation is associated with a wall-clock time, and for any wall-clock time , each router must be activated at some point after . A ranking function assigns a value to routes at the router , such that if , then router 's decision process will prefer over . We treat as the set of ranking functions over all routers .
Our SRS proposal cannot be described by a static ranking function since it changes its decisions across time. However, we say a route selection strategy approaches a ranking function set if there exists some constant time such that for any two paths and , if at some moment has been continually advertised without interruption for time at least and , then at that moment, . Informally, eventually returns to the most-preferred route.
SRS modifies an underlying ranking function representing the standard BGP decision procedure. for approaches because a more-preferred route will always win steps 1 and 2 of the SRS heuristic once the route has been up for time (Section IV-B). However, the condition is more general than SRS. In particular, RFD also approaches , as would SRS even if the heuristic were inserted before the local preference step of the decision process (thus temporarily ignoring customer-provider-peer preferences). We now give our main theorem.
Theorem 1: Suppose a network of BGP routers satisfying GR1, GR2, GR3 runs a route selection strategy that approaches a ranking function set that satisfies GR4. Then, the system converges in finite time for any fair activation sequence.
Proof: Our proof closely follows that of [17] . Let be the AS announcing a destination prefix . A customer path is a path in the network consisting only of provider-tocustomer links. Let be any ordering of all the autonomous systems such that the following.
• If there exists a customer path , then all ASs in every such path appear before in the ordering. • Otherwise, all of 's providers and all ASs with a customer route appear before it in the ordering. Note this ordering is defined based on the topology and business relationships, not on routes advertised by BGP. Such an ordering exists by GR1, GR2 (see [17] for details). We next show by induction on that after some time , every BGP-speaking router in is stable, i.e., it will never select a different path to the destination; moreover, if the router has a customer path, then it has a selected route to . 7 In the base case , all BGP speakers in eventually have a route to the destination and will not alter this path since it is announced locally (any external path would be loopy).
For the inductive step, consider AS . We have two cases. In the first case, some BGP speaker in has a customer path to . Let be the customer of that has largest number . Then, by induction, by time , all customers of that have a customer path are stable and have a selected route to the destination. By GR3, these ASs will advertise paths to by time . By the fact that the route selection strategy approaches that satisfies GR4, each router in will eventually select one of these customer routes. Since all customer routes are stable by and all other routes are less preferred by , all routers in are eventually stable. Otherwise, in the second case, has no customer route. Thus, any adjacent AS who may advertise a route to is either a provider or peer. All providers appear before in the ordering; all peers with a customer route appear before in the ordering; and all peers without a customer route will not advertise a path to (by GR3). Therefore, all ASs that may advertise a route to appear before in the ordering. Let be the set of those peer and provider ASs. If none ever advertises a route to , then all routers in are trivially stable. Otherwise, let be the AS in with largest . By induction, by some time , all ASs in have a stable route to . Thus, by the same argument as above, all BGP speakers in will eventually have a stable route to and are thus stable.
Although does not fit into the above model, it is easy to see that the original proof in [17] and the proof above work essentially without modification for since it simply never switches off a route once it obtains one that is optimal in terms of steps 1 and 2 of the BGP decision process. We omit the proof for the following result.
Theorem 2: Suppose a network of BGP routers satisfying GR1, GR2, GR3 runs and the underlying decision process satisfies GR4. Then, the system converges in finite time for any fair activation sequence.
C. Summary
Our simulations and the above proofs demonstrate that SRS (with or ) preserve BGP safety in the common case of Gao-Rexford policies. However, real-world BGP policies do not always conform to the common case. While we have no reason to believe that SRS introduces a safety problem, we have not ruled out the possibility that SRS could cause divergence in some case important in practice. We leave a resolution of this issue to future work, but note two points. First, divergence is not a phenomenon that has been observed commonly in the wild, so SRS's effect on safety may not be of primary practical importance. Second, our result in [19] indicates that the same safety question is faced by any proposed modification to BGP and is not unique to SRS.
IX. RELATED WORK
Approaches for improving stability of Internet routing typically fall into two classes: modifying the routing protocol or modifying route selection.
Modifying the Routing Protocol: By appending information about the cause of a route update, the convergence process can be shortened [8] , [36] . Loop-free convergence [3] aims to ensure certain correctness properties hold while routing updates are propagating. Instead of changing the network layer, data packets may be sent on overlay networks that can route around failures [24] . Several works propose variants of logically centralized route computation for interdomain routes [25] , [27] , [28] , which can avoid transient problems like loops that plague BGP.
Perhaps surprisingly, techniques do exist that guarantee packets are never dropped due to routing dynamics [34] , [35] (or almost never [32] ). However, these require both data and control plane changes to existing protocols and have not been developed for interdomain routing.
In contrast to the above studies, we refrain from modifying BGP, and our SRS strategies focus on avoiding convergence entirely rather than reducing convergence overhead.
Modifying Route Selection: Some work has studied what path selection policies lead to guaranteed convergence. Griffin et al. [22] showed that a stable state exists if the ASs' policies do not contain a dispute wheel, while [17] showed that by setting policies according to certain locally checkable guidelines (e.g., preferring customer routes), convergence to a stable state is guaranteed. These studies deal only with guaranteeing eventual convergence due to properties of the policies, rather than improving stability beyond the basic property of eventual convergence.
By selecting among multihomed connections with low loss, performance and resilience can be improved [2] . We have overlapping goals, but address the problem in the Internet at large, rather than at multihomed edge sites only, and additionally target control plane load.
Route flap damping [50] suppresses the use of routes that are repeatedly and quickly advertised and withdrawn. Flap damping is known to have pathological behavior that can worsen convergence [36] and, as we have seen, can severely impact availability. Duan et al. [10] improve flap damping's performance by recognizing certain sequences of updates that are not indicative of route flaps, but require an AS to advertise information about its routing policy to adjacent ASs. Recently, Huston [26] proposed delaying updates for short intervals when they match a pattern likely to indicate BGP path exploration. This introduces inconsistent state that can result in loops and outages during the period of delay. Pelsser et al. [41] investigate how to better set RFD's parameters to catch prefixes that are truly flapping rather than undergoing normal BGP path exploration. All these proposals trade availability for stability, while SRS ensures that if a valid path to the destination exists, one will remain advertised.
The most similar work to ours appeared concurrently with our submission and has the same motivation as SRS. Cheng et al. [9] propose RFD with Reachability Guard (RFD RG), which modifies RFD to supress routes only when an alternate exists via another BGP peer, or via a less-specific prefix. Their evaluation uses a methodology very similar to our evaluation with Route Views update feeds (Section VII) and finds a reduction in BGP updates of 5%-27% depending on which IXP data set was used. At LINX, RFD RG reduced updates by 11.87% with a single emulated BGP peer and 21%-25% with more peers. RFD RG is able to improve stability even with a single option for a prefix by falling back to less-specific prefixes. Thus, the 21%-25% improvement exploiting multiple peers and less-specifics is interestingly comparable to SRS's 12% overall reduction (Section VII), which does not utilize less-specifics. However, a direct comparison is not possible since the experimental environments and metrics differ. Additionally, note that RFD RG's routing via less-specifics may not in fact reach the intended destination (e.g., it may lead to a black hole), lessening its improvement. Comparing these proposals head to head would be interesting. We also note that beyond its similarity to [9] , our work contributes a large-scale simulation study and algorithms for bounding the best possible improvement.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper characterized the space of techniques for improving stability in BGP. One of our main contributions was to develop algorithms to bound the best possible points in the stability-availability and stability-deviation tradeoff spaces. Our second main contribution was the design and evaluation of a Stable Route Selection scheme. Experimental and large-scale simulation results show that SRS achieves a significant improvement in control-plane overhead and data-plane reliability with only a small deviation from preferred routes. However, an evaluation of deployment at a single router using direct feeds of route update traffic from Internet routers indicates a smaller improvement.
There are several ways our evaluation would ideally be improved in future work prior to using SRS in a production deployment. First, a larger range of topologies could be studied (though we did characterize certain topological effects; see Fig. 10 ). Second, our software router evaluation would benefit from much larger-scale deployments with realistic failure patterns. Third, our evaluation has not covered the combination of: 1) a large-scale deployment of SRS at many routers, and 2) real-world BGP updates including detailed real-world components like iBGP. Our simulation accomplished only the former, and our evaluation with Route Views update feeds accomplished only the latter. Accomplishing both simultaneously would be interesting and likely difficult.
